Blockchains and Transaction Costs by Henten, Anders Hansen & Windekilde, Iwona Maria
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Blockchains and Transaction Costs
Henten, Anders Hansen; Windekilde, Iwona Maria
Published in:
Nordic and Baltic Journal of Information and Communications Technologies
DOI (link to publication from Publisher):
10.13052/nbjict1902-097X.2020.002
Creative Commons License
Unspecified
Publication date:
2020
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Henten, A. H., & Windekilde, I. M. (2020). Blockchains and Transaction Costs. Nordic and Baltic Journal of
Information and Communications Technologies, 2020(1), 33-52. https://doi.org/10.13052/nbjict1902-
097X.2020.002
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 25, 2020
Blockchains and Transaction Costs
Anders Henten∗ and Iwona Windekilde
CMI, Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen,
Denmark
Email: henten@es.aau.dk; iwona@es.aau.dk
∗Corresponding Author
Received 08 January 2020; Accepted 08 January 2020
Published 03 February 2020
Abstract
This paper examines current business applications of blockchain technology
and discusses blockchain implications for transaction costs. Blockchains are
a relatively new set of technologies that can be used for various business pur-
poses, primarily activities related to contracting. Transaction costs comprise
the operational costs of contacting (searching and communicating) as well as
the costs of contracting (writing and enforcing contracts), and blockchains
can be used to lower, first and foremost, the costs of writing and enforcing
contracts. Other technology applications that have been investigated to a
larger extent, such as multi-sided platforms, primarily help in lowering the
costs of searching and communicating, while blockchains can contribute to
lowering the costs of contracting.
Keywords: Blockchain, transaction costs, contracting.
1 Introduction
This paper examines current business applications of blockchain technology
and discusses blockchain implications for transaction costs. Transaction costs
are in popular terms the costs of ‘doing business’ and the use of information
and communication technologies in different business processes can affect
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the overall transaction costs – mostly in a positive manner lowering the costs
of transactions.
Blockchains are a relatively new set of technologies that can be used
for various business purposes, primarily activities related to contracting.
Transaction costs comprise the operational costs of contacting (searching and
communicating) as well as the costs of contracting (writing and enforcing
contracts), and blockchains can be used to lower, first and foremost, the
costs of writing and enforcing contracts. Other technology applications that
have been investigated to a larger extent, such as multi-sided platforms,
primarily help in lowering the costs of searching and communicating, while
blockchains can contribute to lowering the costs of contracting.
The paper first briefly explains what blockchain technology is and the
areas in which it has found its initial use. The paper, thereafter, presents
different theoretical approaches to the potential implications of blockchain
technologies with an emphasis on transaction costs. Much discussion on
blockchains has hitherto concentrated on the potential transformative and
disruptive implications of blockchains, e.g. (Davidson, De Filippi, and Potts,
2016). In the present paper, emphasis is on examining examples of business
areas, where blockchains already are being used. Three application areas are
examined: the financial sector, real estate, and supply chain and logistics. The
paper ends with an analytical conclusion.
The purposes of the paper are dual in the sense that it seeks to discuss the
use of blockchain technologies in a selected number of business areas as well
as to contribute to a theoretical framework to be applied in further analyses
of blockchains and how they can affect the cost structures of industries.
2 Blockchain Technologies and Smart Contracts
Blockchain technology has attracted much attention since the idea of Bitcoin
cryptocurrency was launched in 2008. Blockchain is not just a specific one
technology. It is a combination of three technologies: private key cryptogra-
phy, a distributed network with a shared ledger, and means of accounting
for the transactions related to the network and records (Zheng and Xie,
2017). Cryptography plays an important role in distributed ledger technology
(DLT) by identifying and authenticating approved participants, confirming
data records, and facilitating consensus on ledger updates (Eichkorn, 2018).
Blockchain as a digital, decentralized ledger keeps a record of all trans-
actions that take place across a peer-to-peer network in a chronological
order. The main features of blockchain technology are: security, immutability,
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decentralized computing infrastructure, and consensus based rules (Zheng
and Xie, 2017).
The promise of blockchain is to challenge centralized top-down
decision-making through radical transparency and auto-enforceable code
(Voshmgir, 2017). In a blockchain system, the ledger is replicated in a large
number of identical databases, each hosted and maintained by an inter-
ested party (Rooney, 2017). When changes are entered in one copy, all the
other copies are simultaneously updated. So, as transactions occur, records
of the value and assets exchanged are permanently entered in all ledgers
(Eichkorn, 2018).
Blockchains have also been described as a value-exchange protocol. The
new way in which blockchain will process various transactions is likely to
be cheaper, more reliable, transparent and faster. The blockchain’s ability to
store transactions and to provide an immutable record allows the participants
to verify and audit transactions in principle almost with no cost.
Since 2008, blockchain has evolved to three main categories: public, pri-
vate and consortium or federated blockchains. The main differences between
public and private blockchain is that a public blockchain is a permissionless
ledger that can be accessed by everyone and all network participants can
check the overall history of the blockchain transactions. Private blockchain is
a blockchain where write permissions are kept centralized by one organiza-
tion and read permissions can be public or restricted to pre-approved parties.
Consortium blockchain is also permissioned, but control over a consortium
blockchain is not granted to a single entity, but rather a group of approved
individuals (Bisade, 2018).
Until now, blockchain technology has developed in different versions,
each having a specific design and new features. The first generation of
blockchain is related to cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin. The Ethereum
platform represents the second generation blockchain technology. The second
generation of blochchain allows building complex distributed applications
beyond the cryptocurrencies. Ethereum introduces a new application of smart
contracting. The third generation adds an extra layer and links different
blockchain networks with each other via smart contracts. The third generation
blockchain network is designed to address the issues of scalability, privacy,
interoperability and governance.
Smart Contracts
The concept of smart contract was first introduced by Nick Szabo in 1994. He
defined a smart contract as a computerized transaction protocol that executes
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the terms of a contract (Szabo, 1994). Smart contracts offer not only the func-
tionality of keeping all records of financial transactions entries but also allow
automatically the implementation of terms of multiparty agreement. Smart
contracts utilize protocols and user interfaces to facilitate all steps of the
contracting process (Szabo, 1996). When smart contracts are implemented
on a blockchain, they are immutable, which means that once created, they
cannot be changed again. They are also decentralized, which implies that
the execution and output of a contract is validated by each participant to
the system and the distributed ledger can guarantee correct execution of the
contract (Destefanis, Bracciali, and Ma, 2018).
Nick Szabo (1994) suggested that the main objectives of smart contract
design are “to satisfy common contractual conditions (such as payment
terms, licenses, confidentiality, and enforcement), minimize exceptions both
malicious and accidental, and minimize the need for trusted intermedi-
aries. Related economic goals include lowering fraud loss, arbitration and
enforcement costs, and other transaction costs.”
Nick Szabo explained in his paper (Szabo, 1997) that the main idea
behind smart contracts is that “many kinds of contractual clauses (such as
collateral, bonding, delineation of property rights, etc.) can be embedded in
the hardware and software we deal with, in such a way as to make breach-
ing of a contract expensive (if desired, sometimes prohibitively so) for the
breacher” (Szabo, 1997). However, smart contracts can just execute certain
pre-programmed steps and will only work if the promise of the contracts has
been fulfilled.
The first smart contract was built on the Ethereum platform, which was
specifically created for that purpose. Ethereum makes smart contracting
possible due to the fact that a peer-to-peer system keeps track of changes to a
decentralized database. The main concerns about Ethereum are the issues of
security, scalability (due to decentralization) and the slow transaction speed
of the Ethereum blockchain, due to the fact that each transaction needs to
be processed by every node in the network. Since Ethereum, many platforms
for smart contracts have been developed, such as: Hyperledger Fabric, Neo,
Counterparty, Stellar, Monax and Lisk, Cardano, ICON and other networks
(Bartoletti and Pompianu, 2017).
With the developments within the third generation smart contracts,
blockchains are focusing on solving the main critical problems faced by
previous generation, such as scalability, interoperability, governance and
sustainability.
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3 Transaction Cost Theory
The theory lens which is applied in this paper is transaction cost theory –
a theory that was developed by Coase in his paper on ‘The nature of the
firms’ (Coase, 1937). This paper basically argued that the reason that we
have firms/companies in the economy is that there are transaction costs when
doing business. If there were no transaction costs in the interaction between
different business entities, all individual economic agents would act on their
own and cooperate freely in loose networked structures. The theory was later
explored by other economists first and foremost Williamson, e.g. (1975), who
used the idea of transaction costs to discuss governance structures in the
economy while placing transaction cost theory at the core of the institutional
view on economics.
The reason that there are transaction costs is that there are costs of ‘doing
business’. In addition to the well-known production costs and transportation
costs, there are costs associated with the interaction between economic (and
other) units. The drivers of such costs have been summarized by Williamson
(1979), (1984) to be the behavioral factors concerning bounded rationality
and opportunism and three other factors concerning uncertainty, asset speci-
ficity and transaction frequency. The kinds of costs incurred while interacting
between business entities are the operational costs including search and
communication costs and the contractual costs including contracting and
enforcement of contracts.
In the present paper, we explore the implications of the implementation
and use of blockchain technology on transaction costs in selected indus-
tries, where blockchain is already being adopted. As can be seen from the
references presented below, the transaction cost perspective on blockchains
is already dealt with by various researchers. The examples that we have
chosen are papers by Tapscott and Tapscott (2017), Iansiti and Lakhani
(2017), Davidson et al. (2016), Catalini and Gans (2018), and Catalini (2017).
However, in our opinion, the potential and actual implications of the use of
blockchain technology on transaction costs in general and in specific industry
cases needs to be further examined.
In a paper in MITSloan Management Review, Tapscott and Tapscott
(2017) elaborate on ‘How blockchain will change organizations’ – the title
of their paper. Their basic point of departure is that while ‘the internet
was designed to move information’, blockchain is designed to move value.
Their claim is that internet has facilitated the interaction between agents in
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markets and has, therefore, contributed to changing the organizational struc-
ture of industries and that blockchain will further change the organizational
structures of industries by reducing the need for intermediaries.
Tapscott and Tapscott (2017) discuss how blockchain affects transaction
costs. They write that blockchain ‘allows companies to eliminate transaction
costs and use resources on the outside as easily as resources on the inside’.
This refers to the basic notion of transaction cost theory by Coase and
Williamson that the reason that we have hierarchies/firms is that the costs
of doing business ‘on the outside’ can be high and that the costs of managing
transactions internally in organization (‘on the inside’) are generally lower –
to a certain limit determined by the ‘agency costs’ (Jensen and Meckling,
1976) of the internal management of companies.
More specifically, Tapscott and Tapscott (2017) discuss the role of smart
contracts in negotiating and enforcing contracts. General transaction cost
theory says that entering into the multitude of short-term contracts, which
companies need to do when they are small and cooperate with other busi-
ness entities in networks of companies, is costly and that larger companies
are vehicles for long-term contracts between the various economic agents.
Blockchains in the form of smart contracts will make it possible to man-
age the many different contracts that small entities have to establish and
will thus create a batter basis for smaller business entities to operate in
markets.
In a paper in Harvard Business Review, Iansiti and Lakhani (2017) discuss
blockchain technology and its use for different business and other societal
purposes. The main aim of the paper is to present a model for the different
phases of the adoption and use of blockchain technology. Their main claim
is that the prospective adoption and use of blockchain technology will take
paths similar to the adoption of the internet TCP/IP technology and that it
will take a good number of years before we will see the full-blown business
and organizational implications of the use of blockchains.
Iansiti and Lakhani (2017) consider blockchain to be what they call a
foundational technology. They differentiate between disruptive technologies
(Christensen, 1997) and foundational technologies, where disruptive tech-
nologies enter the markets with relative low functionalities but eventually
grow to dominate specific markets, but do not necessarily change the whole
foundation of the economy, while foundational technologies as the term
indicates fundamentally change the ways in which markets work. Iansiti and
Lakhani (2017) as Tapscott and Tapscott (2017) state that blockchain technol-
ogy will reduce transaction costs and diminish the need for intermediaries.
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The way that Iansiti and Lakhani (2017) formulate this is that blockchain
technology will change ‘the way we regulate and maintain administrative
control’.
Davidson et al. (2016) were some of the first researchers to present
elaborate ideas on how blockchain can be conceptualized in economics terms.
Their position is that blockchain is best understood as ‘an institutional or
social technology for coordinating people’. They see blockchain as a general
purpose technology (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995) in line with the Iansiti
and Lakhani (2017) conception of foundational technology. The primary
function of this general purpose technology is to decentralize the economy:
‘Blockchains are a technology of decentralization’ as Davidson et al. (2016)
emphasize. The reason is that ‘blockchain technology is trustless, meaning
that it does not require third part verification (i.e. trust)’ (Davidson, De
Filippi, and Potts, 2016).
The Davidson et al. (2016) paper explicitly discusses blockchain tech-
nology in light of transaction cost theory. They relate the functions of
blockchains to the drivers of transaction costs (Wiliamson, 1979) and
(Wiliamson, 1984): Bounded rationality, opportunism, etc. The focus is on
contracts and how blockchains can substitute not only for traditional con-
tracts between different business entities but also for contracts in the sense
that ‘firms exist as a nexus of contracts’ (Davidson, De Filippi, and Potts,
2016), using a concept developed by (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and
building on the transaction cost view that interactions between economic
agents drive costs and that hierarchical organizations are nexuses of con-
tracts limiting the opportunism of economic agents. As Davidson et al.
(2016) write: ‘blockchains are a mechanism to control opportunism’, and ‘if
blockchains can eliminate opportunism, then they will outcompete traditional
organizational hierarchies and relational contracts’.
The two last papers that we refer to are a paper by Catalini and Gans,
where the first version was written in 2016 and a revised version finalized
in 2018, and a paper by Catalini (2017). Catalini and Gans (2018), as the
previous authors, also discuss the potential role of blockchains in relation to
intermediaries. They write that ‘intermediaries add value to marketplaces by
reducing information asymmetry and the risk of moral hazard through third
party verification’, and to the extent that blockchains can remove or reduce
such asymmetries and risks, the role of intermediaries will be significantly
changed. Catalini and Gans (2018) are not as radical in their view on the
potentials for removing intermediaries as can be seen in parts of the literature
on the economic implications of blockchains. They write that ‘while the
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utopian view has argued that blockchain technology will affect every market
by removing the need for intermediaries, we argue that it is more likely to
change the nature of intermediation within digital platforms’. In the paper
by Catalini (2017), he writes that ‘intermediaries will still be able to add
value to transactions, but the nature of intermediation will fundamentally
change’.
In the paper by Catalini (2017), he further explains this view. He writes
that marketplaces enabled by blockchains or cryto-tokens as he also calls
them resemble spot markets in their decentralized and incentives-driven form
(Catalini, 2017) but ‘can also replicate the more complex forms of governance
in a traditional corporation’. There are, therefore, various ways of implement-
ing blockchain technology for existing firms, for instance, with the purpose
simply of lowering costs. However, in the longer run ‘the architectural nature
of the innovation may make some incumbents ill-equipped for its long-
run implications’ (Catalini, 2017). Such a differentiation in the aims and
manners of implementing blockchain technology is in line with the stage
model presented by (Iansiti and Lakhani, 2017).
In transaction cost theory, the reasons for transaction costs are, as
mentioned, related to bounded rationality, opportunism, uncertainty, asset
specificity and transaction frequency. And, the kinds of transaction costs
can be summarized to be concerned with operational costs and costs of
contracting. Our emphasis in this paper is on the implications of the use of
blockchain technology on the kinds of transaction costs. Our proposition is
that the implications of blockchains are primarily on the contractual costs
including contracting and enforcement.
ICTs in general heavily influence transaction costs, both operational and
contractual. However, emphasis has mainly been on the operational costs of
searching and communicating. This applies, for instance, to the various kinds
of ICT platforms that have become such forceful business models during the
past decade. In our paper on ‘Transaction costs and the sharing economy’
(Henten and Windekilde, 2016), we explored how transaction cost theory can
be used to explain the huge growth of two-sided markets and multi-sided
platforms. The main function of such platforms is to reduce the operational
transaction costs of searching and communicating. The main function of
blockchains is to lower the contractual transaction costs of contracting and
enforcement.
Blockchains obviously also have implications for operational costs. This
is well explained in some of the papers referred to above. Tapscott and
Tapscott (2017), for instance, explain how the transparency provided by open
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blockchains can make it easier for businesses to acquire relevant information
on potential business partners and thus for making better and faster business
decisions. Blockchains thus impact on contractual costs as well as operational
costs. But the main implications are on the contractual costs. This is the
reason why the present paper focuses on smart contracts.
With respect to drivers and reasons for transaction costs, we will not
go extensively into this. But it would seem that the major implications of
blockchains are related to opportunism in business relations and the fre-
quency of transactions, while ICTs in general have their major impacts on
limiting bounded rationality and on uncertainty.
4 Application of Blockchain Technology to Various
Industries
Several industries experience various challenges in daily business operations.
Technology experts foresee many applications for blockchain smart contracts
to solve problems related to fraud, low efficiency, human error, cost, trans-
parency of transactions to all concerned parties, trust and many more. This
section reviews the use of smart contracts in the financial sector, real estate,
and supply chains and logistics.
Financial Sector
In banking, there are many existing and developing use cases regarding the
implementation of blockchain, considering that Santander Bank itself has
identified 25 use cases with the main focus on international payments and
smart contracts. A recent article from MEDICI lists 26 banks and financial
Institutions currently exploring the use of blockchain technology (MEDICI,
2018). The main application areas are within money transfer, digital currency
exchange, risk management, cross-border payment, investments, etc. The
smart contract use cases focuses mostly on investment banking and capital
market, commercial and retail banking and insurance.
Recent events have shown that smart contracting has the potential to
be used for bonds. In 2018, the World Bank (World Bank, 2018) ordered
the creation of a blockchain-based bond. The new bond will be created
through Australia’s Commonwealth Bank (CBA) using a private Ethereum
blockchain. According to the World Bank, the bond-i will be the first in
the world to be created, allocated, transferred and managed with blockchain
technology (World Bank, 2018).
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Another application of smart contracts based on the Ethereum blockchain
can be found in lending processes. Blockchain technology can improve lend-
ing processes in retail and commercial lending, trade finance and syndicated
loans. This is possible due to the fact that ordinary loan conditions can
be translated into programmable rules on the blockchain. The new tech-
nology offers much faster processing times, transparent record keeping and
automated lending processes with lower risk (Media, 2018).
Many major banks incorporate the new technology into their systems.
For example ING and Credit Suisse completed the first successful securities
lending transactions using blockchain technology (Suisse, 2018).
The opportunities of blockchain in the financial sector are broad and
encompass: trade finance (supply chain documentation, invoicing and pay-
ments), mortgage lending, loans and crowdfunding for startups and small
and medium-sized enterprises; insurance: automated claims processing, fraud
prevention in luxury goods, and insurance for sharing economy (NullTX,
2018). Smart contracts make all mentioned operations automated and more
efficient. In general, blockchain technology adoption in the finance sector has
been driven by the potential savings arising from efficiency improvements,
increased transparency, reducing fraud, and security of transactions.
Real Estate
Smart contracts can be applicable in the real estate business mainly to man-
age contracts, escrows,1 conveyancing, property records and as a universal
protocol for property buying. The main development within the blockchain
implementation is the focusing on the automation of relevant processes and
documentation on a decentralized blockchain platform.
For real estate business, smart contracts have the potential to increase
financial privacy, speed up transactions, reduce costs and risk. Real estate’s
tech companies are developing smart contracts to improve existing pro-
cesses, such as: property transfer, and recording including transactions. The
blockchain technology is particularly attractive due to the enablement of
paperless land transfer, easier and more accurate deed transfer, simplification
of investment and ownership transfers, and reduction of inefficiencies in
transactions (Deloitte, 2017).
1A bond, deed, or other document kept in the custody of a third party, taking effect only
when a specified condition has been fulfilled.
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Even though the real estate industry is still in the early phases when it
comes to widespread adoption of blockchain, there are many initiatives which
use the blockchain technologies, particularly as a basis for smart contract,
such as velox.RE, Elea Labs, FeeSimple, ChromaWay, and many more.
Velox.RE (Velox.RE, 2018) has developed an open real estate platform
that includes property transfer, recording and payments. It was the first
platform that offers legal blockchain deed2 software and procedural protocol.
This platform is dedicated to real estate stakeholders to offer more trans-
parency, liquidity, and profitability. Velox.Re platform is based on blockchain
Bitcoin, which is a public digital ledger.
Elea Labs (EleaLabs, 2018) provide a platform for a real estate ecosys-
tem, based on Bitcoin smart contracts. The Elea Labs project is a peer-to-peer
network where users control data concerning the real estate they own,
manage, and live in. Elea Labs claim that this platform will eliminate the
complexity and costs associated with acquiring, operating and selling real
estate property.
FeeSimple is an open source blockchain-based protocol that aims to solve
the problems related to access to data, capital and ownership (EosProject,
2018). The platform is still under development. FeeSimple will facilitate
accounting, online leasing, maintenance, crowdfunding, investor manage-
ment, rent payment, property deeds and listings database.
One of the companies focused on a smart contract platform which is coop-
erating with the government is ChromaWay (ChromaWay, 2018). The com-
pany works with the Swedish National Land authority, Lantmäteriet, SBAB,
Landshypotek Bank, Telia and “Kairos Future” to build applications on a pri-
vate blockchain platform, mainly around real estate and finance, and related
to mortgage origination, servicing, and closing processes, digital title man-
agement, and complex contractual workflows (Future, 2017). The Chrom-
aWay platform includes Postchain, Esplix, and Token Technology. Postchain
is described as a consortium database which is suitable for shared use only
between members of a consortium (ChromaWay, 2018). Esplix coordinates
and verifies business agreements and business workflows by using smart
contracts (ChromaWay, 2018). Token Technology, coloured coins, which are
extending the use of bitcoin by adding additional code allows, e.g., to share
money from different accounts without the need to be part of the same bank.
2A legal document that is signed and delivered, especially one regarding the ownership of
property or legal rights.
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Supply Chains and Logistics
Supply chains and logistics are facing many challenges. The supply chain
industry is struggling with complicated record keeping, traceability breaches,
frauds, and visibility challenges. The logistic industry is very fragmented,
which creates problems with transparency, unstandardized processes, low
predictability and high costs.
The main role of smart contract applications in logistics and supply chains
is to enable closer cooperation, better visibility into procurement, reduce
auditing, increase trust, reduce costs, and to provide supply chain visibility
and traceability (Lahoti, 2018).
The applications of blockchain technology to supply chains are com-
pelling. Due to the fact that financial, physical and digital information
are present on the blockchain, it is possible to reduce data redundancy
across trading partners and to have a constantly updated inventory status for
each product with full traceability. Moreover, smart contracts can integrate
delivery and payment system.
Many big companies have started using blockchains in their logistic
activities to improve supply chain transparency and monitor provenance.
Companies like Maersk, IBM, Walmart, Unilever, Alibaba and UPS are
monitoring products in their global supply chain by utilizing blockchain
technology and smart contracts.
Maersk and IBM have established a global TradeLens blockchain-based
platform (Tradelens, 2018) which allows each stakeholder in the supply chain
to view the progress of goods through the supply chain, see the status of
customs documents, and to view a detailed list of a shipment of goods,
and other data. Both companies will sell access to the platform and each
party will be contracting with their own customers. Since the establishment,
TradeLens has logged over 224 million shipping events (Tradelens, 2018). A
total of 90 organizations are now involved with TradeLens, including port
and terminal operators, global container carriers, customs authorities, and
logistics companies (IBM, Blockchain for supply chain, 2018). TradeLens
claims to be an open and neutral industry platform.
Walmart and IBM have joined forces to develop “Food Safety Solution”
(IBM, Blockchain in Food Safety, 2018) based on the IBM blockchain
platform, which makes food traceability possible. As part of this initiative,
all direct suppliers are required to conform to one-step back traceability
on the IBM Food Trust blockchain network by Jan 31, 2019. Afterwards,
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Walmart suppliers are expected to work within their vertical systems or
with their suppliers to enable end-to-end traceability back to ‘the farm’ by
September 30, 2019 (Walmart, 2018). The IBM Blockchain platform is built
on a hyperledger fabric which is a framework for distributed ledger solutions
on permissioned networks.
Blockchain solutions are also widely implemented in transport and affili-
ated industries. Blockchain in Transport Alliance (BiTA, 2018) has more than
450 members in over 25 countries from freight, transport and logistic. BiTA’s
main activities are related to the creation of universal standards formation and
promotion of blockchain technology in the freight industry. BiTA promises
benefits to enterprises, such as lowering risks and costs for both carriers and
shippers, free up capital, speed up processes and security and trust.
5 Analysis and Conclusion
The three cases presented show that blockchain technology is not only a
future prospect. Blockchain technology is already used in various industries,
but it is only in its infancy yet. An increasing number and variety of appli-
cations of blockchain will be developed and launched in the coming years
and will gradually impact on business processes. Iansiti and Lakhani in their
paper (Iansiti and Lakhani, 2017) suggest that the diffusion and adoption of
blockchain technology will develop in phases, and that we have only seen
the beginning of it. At the moment, blockchain technology is not in a phase
where it radically changes business relations and structures. It is mainly used
for improving existing processes and for lowering costs. And, it is even used
for tightening the control of large players over their partners as is indicated in
the example of IBM and Walmart.
Blockchain technology has been launched together with radical prospects
of decentralization and removal of intermediaries. In principle, blockchain
technology can potentially be implemented with these implications. However,
much more empirical evidence concerning the actual use of this technology
is needed in order to form a realistic picture of how these new technolog-
ical potentials will evolve. In the papers referred to, first and foremost the
Tapscott and Tapscott paper (2017), the similarities with Internet in terms of
fundamental changes in industrial services and structures are discussed. As is
well-known, it took Internet a good number of years of development before
it really started impacting business developments and processes. It was the
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diffusion of the World Wide Web, which made the big difference and is also,
in the broader public, considered as the start of Internet. It would seem that
the development and diffusion of blockchain technology will be faster and
that the better comparison is with the World Wide Web in terms of speed and
spread.
Whether blockchain technology will have broad social and business
effects anything similar to Internet is yet to be seen. With respect to the
implications on transaction costs, the greatest effects of Internet have been
on facilitating communications. This applies to the various e-commerce
applications and it applies to the platform business models that have been
springing up in the thousands. The general purpose of these platforms is to
lower transaction costs and the engine is cross-side network effects. Whether
blockchains have a similarly forceful engine is to be seen.
As has been mentioned and also pointed out by the papers referred to,
the primary effect of blockchain technology on transaction costs are on the
contracting part of business operations – while the primary effect of platforms
are on the contacting parts (searching and communicating). But there is an
overlap between platforms and blockchains, as platforms can also facilitate
contracting and blockchains can also make communications easier by means
of, for instance, increased transparency. However, the main effects of the
two sets of institutional technologies, as Davidson et al. (2016) call them,
have different emphases. The combination of these technologies constitutes
a very strong basis for lowering transaction costs and changing business
processes.
Whether blockchain technology will live up to the promises of doing
away with the middleman and strengthening decentralization will very much
depend on how blockchains are implemented and by whom. An expression of
this is whether blockchains will be implemented as public, private or consor-
tium, blockchains. The claims for transparency and openness are associated
with these different forms of solutions.
The three cases that have been presented in this paper are all intermediary
business areas. They obviously have a clear interest in experimenting with
and implementing a set of technologies that potentially could change their
business processes and areas. However, the manner in which they will do it
will basically be to subsume these technologies under their control. Whether
blockchain technology in itself will be a ‘technology of freedom’ or whether
it will be made part of business processes still under the control of strong
intermediaries is not clear yet.
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